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Abstract 
India’s multinational federation has experienced multiple challenges in the last 25 
years, relating to the rise of coalition politics and the process of economic liberalisation, 
both of which have increased the power of some of the states of the federation at the 
expense of others. The internal borders of India continue to be restructured, with the 
latest state, Telangana, created in 2014.  India is often seen as a successful multinational 
federation but it is important to recognise the limitations of this success, as well as the 
areas where the rise of an aggressive Hindu nationalism poses a powerful threat to 
India’s multinational federal democracy. 
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Introduction: Current Challenges to Multinational Federalism in Indiai 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, there have been only three articles on India, the world’s largest 
federation (by population) in Regional and Federal Studies - by Bakke (2009), 
Bhattacharyya (2015) and Mahapatra (2017). India did additionally feature in a wider 
analysis of Commonwealth federations (Watts 2003), as an ethnofederation in Roeder 
(2009) and as an example of miscoding in an analysis of Riker’s work (McKay 2004). 
Wilfried Swenden also published a review article on federalism in South Asia (2012). 
This lack of attention to Indian federalism in this journal is all the more surprising 
because the multinational character of the Indian federation and the influence of its 
structures on managing identity conflicts are well-established (Kohli 1997, Manor 
1998, Adeney 2007, Bhattacharyya 2007 and 2010; Stepan, Linz et al. 2011, 
Shneiderman and Tillin 2015).  We can only guess at the reason for this omission. One 
possible reason is that, with the exception of a few scholars, India is not seen as an 
example that has relevance for the study of other federations either because of its 
extreme diversity (with an effective number of linguistic groups (ENLG) of 8.5 at the 
time of independence) or because it is situated within the developing world and thus 
‘western’ political concepts are not seen as applicable.ii Another explanation could be 
that India’s federation has been traditionally criticised for being too centralised, with 
some calling it a quasi federation (Wheare 1963, Riker 1964) because of the 
constitutional provisions concerning emergency ruleiii and the ability of the centre to 
change unilaterally state boundaries and create or disintegrate states under Article 3 of 
the Indian Constitution.  It may also be explained by the targeting of more disciplinary 
or area studies journals by authors working on the country.  
 
The nature of this multinational federalism and the challenges it faces are discussed in 
more detail below. However, given the changes in India over the last 25 years or so, 
many of the effects of which are still to be understood, and the constant restructuring 
of its internal borders, the time is ripe for a special section of Regional and Federal 
Studies focusing on the nature of this multinational federation, its real achievements in 
the promotion of a multinational democracy as well as areas where this democracy has 
been potentially threatened by multinational federalism. 
 
Multinational Federalism 
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The concept of a multinational federation, as distinguished from mono-national ones, 
usually requires that ‘the boundaries of the internal units are … drawn in such a way 
that at least some of them are controlled by national or ethnic minorities’ (McGarry and 
O'Leary 2003: 3). In Asia, the countries of India, Nepal, Pakistan and Malaysia are 
multinational federations (Adeney 2007, Bakar 2007, Bhattacharyya 2010, Malagodi 
2013), although not all groups in these countries possess their own state(s). These 
multinational federations contrast with 
 
… national federations [which] may be nationally or ethnically homogeneous 
(or predominantly so), or they are organized, often consciously, so as not to 
recognize more than one official nationality – often this happens in such a way 
that the state’s national and ethnic minorities are also minorities in each of the 
constituent units (McGarry and O'Leary 2003: 3). 
 
The United States is an example of such a mono-national federation; its social and 
cultural mosaic is quite diverse but this is not reflected in its territorial arrangements 
(Seymour and Gagnon 2012). This definition of a multinational federation is more 
limited, however, than the criteria proposed by Richard Simeon for a wider 
consideration of ‘territorial pluralism.’ This definition not only provides for ‘self-
government but also, frequently, for equitable forms of recognition and power-sharing 
arrangements within central or federal governments’ (2015, 3). 
 
The above distinction between multinational and national federations raises, first of all, 
the question of what is the nation that may or may not be recognised within federal 
structures and what is its relationship to the state or wider national identity? The 
theoretical literature on nations and nationalism is rich and diverse.  The definition of 
a ‘nation’ is contested. The late Walker Connor defined nations as ‘self-defining ethnic 
group[s]’ (1978). However, this ignores, as Sami Zubaida has argued, the possibility of 
civic nations, nations that are not defined on the basis of ethnicity, but are (ostensibly) 
more inclusive (1989).  If we think of a ‘high’ definition of the nation, such as that 
expounded by Max Weber, then a nation is a ‘community of sentiments which 
adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which 
normally tends to produce a state of its own’ (Gerth and Mills 1948: 176). This 
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definition is not in quarrel with Benedict Anderson’s famous definition of the nation as 
an ‘imagined political community’ for whom a (nation-) state is a possibility (1983: 
13). Ernest Gellner’s definition of the nation suggests that the people must ‘share the 
same culture, when culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations 
and way of behaving and communicating’ and ‘who recognize each other as belonging 
to the same nation...’ (1983). But, as many authors have argued, this culture does not 
have to be defined along ethnic lines and there are many nations that are multinational 
(O’Leary 1997). It is important to recognise that nations need not aspire to a state of 
their own, although much of the literature on nations and nationalism portrays this as 
‘natural’ desire of a nation. 
  
By accepting that self-determination is possible within a multinational state, we can 
understand how federal institutional structures and arrangements can provide an 
institutional structure for a state to be home to many nations, in a manner which Stepan, 
Linz and Yadav have described as a ‘state-nation’ (2011). However, the question as to 
what defines a homeland in a heterogeneous country such as India is often unclear. Do 
homelands possess a clear majority of the population belonging to the group that is 
claiming that homeland? Do they have clear-cut geographical boundaries, and who has 
the ‘rightful’ claim to the territory? These questions are not merely academic. The 
States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) of India defined homogeneity as comprising 
over 70 percent of the territory in question. This meant that there could be sizeable 
minorities within that territory, especially considering the large populations of many 
Indian states (SRC 1955).  The existence of a large number of minorities within a 
particular ‘homeland’ is particularly perplexing when considering the case of the 
Bodos, as discussed by Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee in this special section. In 
addition, which groups are conceded the right to a homeland is important.  For example, 
whether the boundaries of the Indian Punjab would be redrawn around a religious or a 
linguistic group was a thorny issue in its belated reorganisation. Finally, as Kham 
Hausing argues in his contribution to this section, the definition of a group along 
particular lines (such as the linguistically defined Telugus) may undermine the claims 
of those who do not feel affiliation to that identity, or obscure the divisions within that 
group. 
 
Multinational federalism in India 
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India is one of the world’s most diverse countries. In the more recent literature on 
comparative federalism India is considered as a ‘holding together’ rather than ‘coming 
together’ federation (Stepan 1999) and was officially framed as a ‘Union of States.’ 
Despite, or as some would argue, because of its extreme diversity (Manor 1996), it has 
achieved remarkable success in ensuring relatively enduring ethnic peace and political 
order. The embedded multinational nature of India’s federation has ensured that India 
has successfully promoted and inculcated multiple identities within a single polity 
(Arora and Verney 1995), although there are limits on the promotion of anti-national 
opinions such as the prohibition on advocating secession in the 16th Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
 
The Constitution of 1950 made some concession to the multinational nature of the state 
– allowing states to adopt the language(s) in which they would operate.  This policy 
ensured that they were allowed to use this language internally within the state. Article 
345 of the Indian Constitution states that 
 
… the Legislature of a State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages 
in use in the State or Hindi as the official language or languages to be used for 
all or any official purposes of that State … Provided that, until the Legislature 
of the State otherwise provides by law, the English language shall continue to 
be used for those official purposes within the State for which it was being used 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Government of 
India 2016). 
 
In terms of communication with the Union (the centre), Article 346 provided that  
The language for the time being authorised for use in the Union for official 
purposes shall be the official language for communication between one State 
and another State and between a State and the Union (Government of India 
2016). 
In the Constitution, both Hindi and English were authorised for use for official purposes 
(Article 343). This allowed English to remain as a link language.  Although this 
provision was due to lapse after 15 years, it was renewed after violent protests by non-
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Hindi speakers, mainly in the southern states of India (Hardgrave 1993). Not only was 
Hindi not spoken by the majority of the population, as importantly, it was perceived to 
be inferior to many of the other Indian languages by members of these linguistic 
groups. iv The Constitution of India under Article 344 and 351(1) has provided for 
nationally recognizing languages and placing them in the Eighth Schedule of the 
Constriction. So far 22 languages have been scheduled, including Hindi. This 
recognition of languages is a symbolic recognition of identity in non-territorial terms. 
In addition, there are scheduled languages that do not have any territorial concentration, 
e.g. Sanskrit, Santhali and Sindhi.  
 
The federation that eventually took shape was not exactly a ‘holding together’ 
federation because the process was complex and the internal boundaries of the country 
were radically redrawn. The centre had to right-size the territorial unit to correspond 
with the cultural unit (Callaghy, O'Leary and Lustick 2001). Article 3 of the 
Constitution, allowing the centre to unilaterally redraw the borders of the states (with 
the consultation but not the consent of the state government to be secured, in contrast 
to the neighbouring state of Pakistan) proved to be a vital instrument securing the 
flexibility of the Indian state to respond to demands from groups (Menon 1956, Menon 
1957, Nayar 1966, Schwartzberg 1985, Bhattacharyya 2010, Sarangi and Pai 2011, 
Tillin 2013).v 
 
Before independence the Indian National Congress was committed to the 
reorganisation of the internal borders of the country along linguistic lines after 
independence.  It restructured its own party organisation around linguistically dominant 
communities in 1917, and the Nagpur session of the Congress in 1920 formally 
recognised the policy. This decision was as much strategic as it was normative.  Without 
cultivating the vernacular linguistic identity, the party could not mobilise mass support. 
The provincial party units became the substitute for the future states of India, and 
Pradeep Chhibber has demonstrated how the Congress was based on the different social 
cleavages in the respective states (1989, 1999: 52-3). As such, it is possible to talk of 
multiple nations in India, all having their distinctive history and memories; their pride 
in their language and culture and their sense of belonging to a definite territory. 
Although many Congress leaders sought to renege from the commitment to create 
linguistically defined provinces after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular not 
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being personally persuaded about the wisdom of a reorganisation (Adeney 2002), 
divisions within the INC and the threat to the hegemony of the party (Adeney 2007, 77-
8) eventually led to the establishment of the SRC.  
 
 
Although its official recommendations in 1955 for the formation of the so-called 
linguistic states were cautious (the Report recommended a balanced approach between 
language, economic viability and administrative convenience (SRC 1955)), in practice 
the reorganisations that were undertaken were predominantly on the grounds of 
language. 16 new states were created in 1956.  They were followed by the 
reorganisation of the states of Bombay (into the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra in 
1960) and Punjab (into a smaller Punjab and Haryana in 1966vi). The division of the 
latter was controversial and, as Paul Brass has argued, imperfect (1994: 194).  We 
return to this point below. In general however, in India, as opposed to Pakistan, 
extending territorial recognition to linguistic groups was compatible with the Indian 
nation building strategy, ostensibly based on territorial criteria (Adeney 2007). Despite 
Nehru’s concerns and those expressed by academics such as Selig Harrison (1960), 
most observers argue that linguistic reorganisation has been a success in 
accommodating the diverse linguistic groups of India: at least those that were 
territorially concentrated enough to have secured their own state (Adeney 2007, 
Bhattacharyya 2010). Although some commentators in the 1990s bemoaned the fact 
that linguistic reorganisation had increased the regionalisation of the party system 
(India Today 1998), this should be understood as a comment on political rather than 
federal instability.  
 
However, as this special section demonstrates, ‘ethnofederalism’ has had mixed results 
in different parts of India (see also Adeney 2017). Firstly, in much, although not all, of 
the ‘peripheral’ Northeast, there have been counter-ethnic mobilisations against the 
dominant tribal ethnic group as Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee discuss in their article.  
Such mobilisation demonstrates the problems that territorial solutions to ethnic claims 
for recognition in areas of extreme diversity can pose.  In other parts of India, ethnic 
self-rule has had mixed results for different reasons. In the case of Punjab, an imperfect 
reorganisation and the political machinations of the central government increased rather 
than decreased ethnic tensions. While the (often) religiously defined political elite has 
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been effectively accommodated within the new political dispensation, as Gurharpal 
Singh and Heewon Kim highlight in their article, given their alliance with the BJP, the 
Akali Dal has had to eschew their demands for more autonomy. To maintain their 
support base they have had to increase the use of patronage politics at the expense of 
good governance (although identity based parties are not the only parties to use this 
strategy within India (Wilkinson 2007), and the strategy failed to return the Akali Dal 
in power in the 2017 state elections (Singh 2017)).  Finally, although linguistic 
reorganisation must be seen as a success in terms of consolidating state level elite rule 
and depoliticising linguistic identity, there are examples where alternative narratives of 
deprivation have been articulated to demand a further reorganisation (such as in 
Uttarkahand, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh) (Mawdsley 2002, Tillin 2013). The case of 
Telangana is only the most recent example of this, as Kham Hausing discusses in his 
article.  The different ways in which multinational federalism in India can be questioned 
are discussed in turn below. 
 
Minorities within ‘ethnic homelands’ 
 
Multinational federations can be a problematic solution for minorities not large enough 
to demand their own state, or those that are territorially separated from their larger 
group. Unlike the linguistic reorganisations of the 1950s and 1960s where linguistic 
identity was relatively easy to marry up with territory, in many of the North Eastern 
regions (although not all) the correspondence between the cultural boundary and the 
territorial one was nearly non-existent, causing James Manor to comment that Northeast 
India was too diverse to be accommodated using federal mechanisms (1998: 33).  These 
high levels of diversity meant that the redrawing of boundaries did not produce 
particularly homogeneous states and even in cases where one identity was recognised, 
other identities became more prominent. In keeping with the developmentalist nation 
building approach of the Indian state (Guyot-Réchard 2013), the SRC made explicit 
note of the need for a ‘well planned programme for the development’ of the region 
(SRC 1955: 194). However, despite the SRC’s reservations, the centre sanctioned the 
creation of the state of Nagaland in 1963 (from Assam) and others have followed 
(Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh).  These reorganisations were based 
more on the recognition of tribal ethnicity than language. Such a ‘tribal’ identity often 
obscured several sub-divisions.  Thus the SRC noted that ‘[r]acially, linguistically and 
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culturally, even the tribes which are described compendiously under … the Nagas, are 
in reality different each from the other’ (SRC 1955: 194). As an example of this, after 
the creation of Nagaland – ostensibly a state for the Nagas - the ENLG (a calculation 
describing the ‘effective’ number of groups within a territory rather than the absolute 
number) was over 11, much higher than that for the rest of India. 
 
Table 1: Demographics of Northeast India.  
 
State Percentage 
of India’s 
pop. 
Percentage 
of tribal 
pop. 
Effective 
No. Ling 
Groups 
Effective 
No. Rel 
Groups 
Largest religious 
group  
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
0.11 68.8 3.65 3.86 Christians  30.26% 
Assam 2.58 12.4 2.37 2.01 Hindus  61.47% 
Manipur 0.22 35.1 2.34 2.81 Hindus  41.39% 
Meghalaya 0.24 86.1 2.77 1.73 Christians  74.59% 
Mizoram 0.09 94.4 1.70 1.30 Christians  87.16% 
Nagaland 0.16 86.5 11.93 1.28 Christians  87.93% 
Sikkim 0.05 20.6 2.42 2.38 Hindus 57.76% 
Tripura 0.30 31.8 1.87 1.42 Hindus 83.4% 
 
Notes:  
Data on religion taken from Government of India (2011) 
Data on language taken from Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities (2014). 
 
Excluding Nagaland as an outlier, the average number of effective linguistic groups 
within Indian states is less than two (1.98). No state outside the Northeast of India, with 
the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, has over two effective linguistic groups. The 
picture is similar in terms of religion; the all India average is 1.73 effective religious 
groups (ENRG) per state. vii  The only states outside the Northeast with over two 
effective religious groups are Kerala and Punjab. Brendan O’Leary (2001) has argued 
that federations require the dominant community within the territory - the Staatsvolk - 
to be dominant enough to be magnanimous to minority groups.  This argument can also 
be applied at the state or provincial level; if a territory is too diverse conflict will ensue 
without additional power sharing mechanisms. 
 
Many groups (such as the Nagas) also cross state boundaries. India’s 2011 census report 
records some 15 Naga tribes in Manipur (5.7 per cent of Manipur’s population). The 
diversity of the Northeast has been increased by colonial era migration into the 
plantations, migration as a result of the Bangladesh war of independence, as well as 
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more recent economic migration.  These data demonstrate firstly, that the 
reorganisations of the Northeast have not been effective in ensuring that territorial and 
ethnic boundaries coincide. But they also demonstrate the difficulty of using 
ethnofederal reorganisation as an effective strategy to manage ethno-national 
differences in this area. The nation building strategies that worked in many other parts 
of India have therefore struggled to find purchase in much of the Northeast. The 
concession of these demands have often spawned competing claims for further 
territorial restructuring because of the absence of clear cut divisions between groups 
and territories, and the very tiny, unviable size of the territories claimed. Conflicting 
ethnic claims from peoples living in the same territory rooted in demands for 
recognition and power remain the real challenges to the legitimacy of India as the 
world’s largest democracy.viii 
 
They have prompted heavy-handed security responses (Vajpeyi 2009) coupled with 
bipartite and tripartite ‘ethnic peace accords’ after protracted negotiations with the 
ethnic rebels.  Some of these claims have been accommodated through asymmetrical 
autonomy arrangements such as those in Mizoram and Tripura (Bhattacharyya and 
Nossiter 1988, Tillin 2007, Bhattachaaryya 2018). But they have failed to do so in other 
states where groups are intermixed (witness the continuing conflict in Bodoland in 
Assam) or when a group within an existing state demands more than a sub-state solution 
(the Garos in Meghalaya, the Gorkhas in West Bengal and the Kukis in Assam). Many 
of these are of long standing duration. 
 
It is thus possible to argue that the greatest possible homogeneity in the local titular 
nationality when armed with relative autonomy is the best guarantee for ethnic peace 
(Adeney 2017; Deiwiks 2011: 5). That, after the creation of Mizoram (ENLG 1.70, 
ENRG 1.3), insurgency has considerably dissipated compared to Nagaland (ENLG 
11.93, ENRG 1.28), Manipur (ENLG 2.34, ENRG 2.81), and Meghalaya (ENLG 2.77, 
ENRG 1.73) supports this. When it is not possible to achieve this level of homogeneity, 
then other more localised power sharing measures are necessary, as the article by 
Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee argues. Whether these are possible to achieve within the 
majoritarian system of India is, however, questionable. 
 
Marginalised groups 
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Although concerns over the limitations of ethnofederalism as an all encompassing 
strategy have been most loudly articulated in relation to the Northeastern states, as 
Brass (1994) and Steven Wilkinson (2000) remind us, there are many states where the 
linguistic minorities are not in a position to argue for their own state, such as Urdu 
speakers in the northern Hindi states. In these situations, additional arrangements need 
to be considered. The Indian constitution makes provision for these linguistic 
minorities. The Constitution of India (Government of India 2016) under Article 29: the 
‘protection of interests of minorities’ (as fundamental rights) states that:  
 
Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof 
having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to 
conserve the same. 
 
It further provides that  
 
No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained 
by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, language or any of them.  
 
And that 
 
All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
 
However, the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities has made clear (2014) that these 
constitutional protections are weak and often honoured more in the breach than in the 
observance. Statehood in India has generally benefitted the dominant groups of the 
particular state to the relative exclusion of the marginalised.  An example of this are the 
longstanding aspirations and demands of the territorially concentrated Telangana 
Telugus. They have articulated grievances against their discrimination and domination 
by their ethno linguistic kin group located in more prosperous regions.  At the time of 
the creation of the state of Andhra Pradesh concerns were raised by the Telangana 
region, with a historical memory of being politically separate, about their political 
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domination by the coastal Andhra and Rayalseema regions.  A ‘Gentlemen’s’ power 
sharing agreement was put in place, including guarantees concerning development 
expenditure. Unfortunately, as Kham Hausing demonstrates in this special section, the 
arrangement was ‘observed more in the breach than the observance.’ 
 
Kham Hausing’s paper confirms the point made by Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee in 
this special section that ethnofederal solutions can be problematic and that additional 
safeguards may be required to manage sub-state diversity. Many of these can also 
mitigate the majoritarianism of the Indian federal structures, but, as they warn, others 
can, as in the case of the Bodoland Territorial Council, increase tensions, and lead to 
conflicts with other groups in the region.  Although the special status of Jammu & 
Kashmir is often referred to in discussions of Indian federalism, the Sixth Schedule of 
the Indian Constitutionix provides for an asymmetrical relationship of ‘[t]erritorialized 
regimes of positive discrimination for certain groups … creat[ing] a set of cascading 
‘autonomous’ institutions below the level of the state’ (Shneiderman and Tillin 2015: 
14). The creation of tribal district councils/regional councils in several, although not all 
the states of the Northeast, were designed to enable the self-governance of the tribal 
areas and include legislative powers in respect of certain areas affecting tribal life. 
These have been successful in Mizoram and Tripura, with lower levels of overlapping 
diversity, but unsuccessful in more diverse Assam (Saikia 2015). Their analysis has 
implications for the redrawing of boundaries around ethnic groups in diverse regions 
as well as the efficacy of majoritarianism as a political principle of governance in such 
a complex multiethnic mosaic.  
 
The Periphery 
 
Other areas where the success of multinational federalism in India must be questioned 
includes areas where levels of violence have been higher.  This includes many of the 
states of the Northeast but also the states of Punjab and Kashmir. Singh (2000), 
Wilkinson (2008) and Katharine Adeney (2007) have separately argued that the Indian 
state adopted different strategies of managing the areas where non-Hindu majorities 
resided, partially, but not only, because of their geographical proximity to land borders 
in a security conscious part of the world (e.g. the use of pellet guns, deployed in 
Kashmir since the summer of 2016, is difficult to imagine in other states of India 
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(Adeney 2017: 140-1)). These border regions often possess a population that differs 
from the so-called Hindu ‘Staatsvolk’ – comprising approximately 80 percent of the 
population of India. Although Hindus are divided by caste, region and language, some, 
such as Singh (2000), have argued that the Indian multinational federal democracy 
operates as an ethnic democracy along religious lines. Singh points to the fact that the 
border regions, where the majority of religious minorities reside, are viewed with 
suspicion.  These regions have witnessed higher levels of violence than other states. 
This violence has dwarfed the well-publicised Maoist violence in what is called India’s 
‘red corridor’, and previously considered the greatest security threat to India.  
 
The advent of coalition politics at the national level has gone hand in hand with the rise 
of Hindu nationalism as a political force (Jaffrelot 2009) As a political force the BJP 
and its affiliates have traditionally advocated a unitary concept of the Indian nation. 
However, in practice, it revealed itself to be more accommodating of regionalist 
demands, adapting to the logic of coalition politics before its main national rival, the 
Indian National Congress (Adeney 2005).  As well as making alliances with regional 
and caste based political parties it has also made alliances with regionalist political 
parties in Punjab and Kashmir (Kailash 2014). In this special section Singh and Kim 
analyse the paradoxical case of Punjab, site of a Sikh secessionist campaign in the 
1980s and 1990s, but where the Sikh political party is now a coalition partner of the 
centralist Hindu Nationalist BJP.  They use the example of Punjab to argue that while 
India may be accommodationist along linguistic lines (although the limitations of this 
strategy are made clear by other contributions to this special section), India is best 
understood as an ‘ethnic democracy’ in relation to religious identities. They argue that 
while ethnofederalism as a strategy may have worked in the ‘mainland’, the strategy in 
the peripheries has been ‘hegemonic control’.  In an important addition to the ethnic 
democracy debate, they argue that the abandonment of the ethno-national agenda by 
the Sikh political party, the Akali Dal has required them to adopt more populist 
measures to maintain their support, at the expense of good government in the state. 
However, this development has not been unique to Punjab, indeed, it could be said that 
the linguistic reorganisation of the country created the conditions for patronage politics 
to emerge (Wyatt 2009).   
 
Conclusion: Challenges to multinational federalism in India 
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All the articles in this special section reveal the importance of looking at the sub-state 
level in understanding the nature of the Indian multinational federation in the 21st 
century.  The papers have deconstructed any stereotypical understanding of Indian 
multinational federalism in which all ethnic conflicts are considered resolved. The 
situation on the ground is not as satisfactory. In addition, as the papers in this special 
section set out, the post-1990s mode of accommodation is different. The major 
challenges relate to coalition politics and economic liberalisation, which have led to the 
rise of economically more powerful states (known as ‘forward states’) with equally 
powerful chief ministers at their helms.  This has strengthened the power of the larger, 
mainly linguistically defined states, but at the expense of the smaller states, such as 
those in the Northeast – already on the periphery of India due to their geographical 
location and small population size.  
 
With the decline of the Congress as the one dominant party and the rise of coalition 
politics at the Centre, a different route to accommodation of ethno-regional identity was 
cultivated in terms of coalition agreements with many regional and state-based parties. 
The two major coalitions, though with vastly different ideological orientations but 
similar stance on reforms, have alternated in power – the United Progressive Alliance 
led by the Congress (2004-08) (Centre-Left) and the National Democratic Alliance 
(Centre-Right) led by the BJP (1996, 1998-2004; 2014-). The intra-party 
accommodation of the Congress-era had been replaced by inter-party accommodation 
of diversity via the route of broad based coalition governments. However, 
representatives from the Northeast of the country have minimal importance in coalition 
politics given the small number of seats returned from the region.   
 
At the same time economic liberalisation poses new challenges. Because of their poor 
infrastructure, the Northeastern states have a seriously reduced ability to secure foreign 
direct investment. These challenges are likely to be exacerbated given the abolition of 
the Planning Commission in 2014 in favour of the National Institution for Transforming 
India. (NITI Aayog) (Swenden and Saxena 2017). The abolition of the Planning 
Commission means that the special financial support given to the states in the Northeast 
has been automatically withdrawn.  The removal of the Special Category Status of these 
states who received (favourable) asymmetric financial treatment from the Centre has 
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raised concerns among the elite of the region. Historically, about 80 percent of the 
region’s revenue came from the centre, 90 percent of which was in grants rather than 
loans.x  These grants have enabled many of the states in the region to perform well in 
terms of Human Development Indicators. The removal of this assistance has not only 
raised questions about the future financing of the region but may also impact on the 
allocation of resources to the sub-state autonomous bodies, with a potential increase in 
ethnic conflict between groups. 
 
The arguments presented in this special section give credence to the analysis of those 
who argue that, while ethnofederalism may not be the state breaker that it is often 
portrayed to be e.g. by Philip Roeder (2009), the majoritarian principle of winner takes 
all may need to be qualified (McGarry and O'Leary 2009, Cederman, Hug et al. 2015, 
Adeney 2017) through more appropriate power sharing mechanisms. The analysis 
presented here draws our attention to the importance of considering power sharing, 
along both territorial and non-territorial lines within the federal units (as well as at the 
centre) so that the inevitable ‘others’ within that unit do not feel excluded.  Such 
accommodation may alleviate the demands for future territorial restructuring of the 
Indian federation (for example the state of Gorkhaland from West Bengal or the Garos 
in Meghalaya). Even if it does not, it provides a platform for these demands within the 
constitutional process. Whether this is possible within India’s winner takes all’ electoral 
system, is, however, debatable.  
 
However, since the rise of the BJP to power in the Centre in 2014 there has been an 
apparent move in favour of what is styled as ‘competitive and co-operative federalism’, 
and a renewed emphasis on a unitary concept of the nation, a la Hindutva, de-emphasis 
on recognition of ethnic identity, and political centralisation. Although the BJP secured 
a majority of seats in the 2014 election, only 31 percent of the electorate voted for the 
party. Despite this, the linguistic bargain of the 1960s is coming under pressure 
(Adeney 2015).  Cultural and political pluralism, the elan vitae of the political 
construction of the national identity of India, is under threat from a Hindutva theory of 
the nation, which seeks to privilege the so-called Hindus at the cost of the millions of 
non-Hindus (the Muslims, the Christians, the Sikhs and others) (Jaffrelot 2016: 16-23).  
Should this trend continue, the politics of Hindu nationalism would not only challenge 
the religious minorities within India, including the Sikhs, but the multiple linguistic 
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groups too. Hindu nationalism is clearly a great threat to Indian multinational 
federalism. Although we have demonstrated that these groups are far from 
homogeneous, the prioritisation of the Hindi-speaking northern and western states 
within an Indian national identity may be a bad omen for India’s territorial integrity and 
national identity, thus far based on pluralism and multiculturalism. 
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